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66 lines
2.4 KiB
66 lines
2.4 KiB
3 years ago
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#!/bin/sh
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# Copyright (c) 2014-2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
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# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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export LC_ALL=C
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INPUT=$(cat /dev/stdin)
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VALID=false
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REVSIG=false
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IFS='
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'
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if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then
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GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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else
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# Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling
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# signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that
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# collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself,
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# in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's
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# semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory
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# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
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# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
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# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
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GPG_RES=""
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for LINE in $(gpg --version); do
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case "$LINE" in
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"gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*)
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echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr
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GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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;;
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# We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+
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# gpg will fail otherwise
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# We assume if you're running 1.X, it is either 1.4.1X or 1.4.20+
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# gpg will fail otherwise
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esac
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done
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[ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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fi
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for LINE in $GPG_RES; do
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case "$LINE" in
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"[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*)
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while read KEY; do
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[ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true
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done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys
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;;
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"[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*)
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[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
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REVSIG=true
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GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
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;;
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"[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG "*)
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[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
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REVSIG=true
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GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
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;;
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esac
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done
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if ! $VALID; then
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exit 1
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fi
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if $VALID && $REVSIG; then
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printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "^\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)"
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echo "$GOODREVSIG"
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else
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printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
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fi
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