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142 lines
7.5 KiB
142 lines
7.5 KiB
3 years ago
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# JSON-RPC Interface
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The headless daemon `bitcoind` has the JSON-RPC API enabled by default, the GUI
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`bitcoin-qt` has it disabled by default. This can be changed with the `-server`
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option. In the GUI it is possible to execute RPC methods in the Debug Console
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Dialog.
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## Versioning
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The RPC interface might change from one major version of Bitcoin Core to the
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next. This makes the RPC interface implicitly versioned on the major version.
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The version tuple can be retrieved by e.g. the `getnetworkinfo` RPC in
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`version`.
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Usually deprecated features can be re-enabled during the grace-period of one
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major version via the `-deprecatedrpc=` command line option. The release notes
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of a new major release come with detailed instructions on what RPC features
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were deprecated and how to re-enable them temporarily.
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## Security
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The RPC interface allows other programs to control Bitcoin Core,
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including the ability to spend funds from your wallets, affect consensus
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verification, read private data, and otherwise perform operations that
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can cause loss of money, data, or privacy. This section suggests how
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you should use and configure Bitcoin Core to reduce the risk that its
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RPC interface will be abused.
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- **Securing the executable:** Anyone with physical or remote access to
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the computer, container, or virtual machine running Bitcoin Core can
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compromise either the whole program or just the RPC interface. This
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includes being able to record any passphrases you enter for unlocking
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your encrypted wallets or changing settings so that your Bitcoin Core
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program tells you that certain transactions have multiple
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confirmations even when they aren't part of the best block chain. For
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this reason, you should not use Bitcoin Core for security sensitive
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operations on systems you do not exclusively control, such as shared
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computers or virtual private servers.
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- **Securing local network access:** By default, the RPC interface can
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only be accessed by a client running on the same computer and only
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after the client provides a valid authentication credential (username
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and passphrase). Any program on your computer with access to the file
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system and local network can obtain this level of access.
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Additionally, other programs on your computer can attempt to provide
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an RPC interface on the same port as used by Bitcoin Core in order to
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trick you into revealing your authentication credentials. For this
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reason, it is important to only use Bitcoin Core for
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security-sensitive operations on a computer whose other programs you
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trust.
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- **Securing remote network access:** You may optionally allow other
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computers to remotely control Bitcoin Core by setting the `rpcallowip`
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and `rpcbind` configuration parameters. These settings are only meant
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for enabling connections over secure private networks or connections
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that have been otherwise secured (e.g. using a VPN or port forwarding
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with SSH or stunnel). **Do not enable RPC connections over the public
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Internet.** Although Bitcoin Core's RPC interface does use
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authentication, it does not use encryption, so your login credentials
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are sent as clear text that can be read by anyone on your network
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path. Additionally, the RPC interface has not been hardened to
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withstand arbitrary Internet traffic, so changing the above settings
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to expose it to the Internet (even using something like a Tor onion
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service) could expose you to unconsidered vulnerabilities. See
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`bitcoind -help` for more information about these settings and other
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settings described in this document.
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Related, if you use Bitcoin Core inside a Docker container, you may
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need to expose the RPC port to the host system. The default way to
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do this in Docker also exposes the port to the public Internet.
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Instead, expose it only on the host system's localhost, for example:
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`-p 127.0.0.1:8332:8332`
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- **Secure authentication:** By default, Bitcoin Core generates unique
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login credentials each time it restarts and puts them into a file
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readable only by the user that started Bitcoin Core, allowing any of
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that user's RPC clients with read access to the file to login
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automatically. The file is `.cookie` in the Bitcoin Core
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configuration directory, and using these credentials is the preferred
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RPC authentication method. If you need to generate static login
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credentials for your programs, you can use the script in the
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`share/rpcauth` directory in the Bitcoin Core source tree. As a final
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fallback, you can directly use manually-chosen `rpcuser` and
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`rpcpassword` configuration parameters---but you must ensure that you
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choose a strong and unique passphrase (and still don't use insecure
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networks, as mentioned above).
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- **Secure string handling:** The RPC interface does not guarantee any
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escaping of data beyond what's necessary to encode it as JSON,
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although it does usually provide serialized data using a hex
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representation of the bytes. If you use RPC data in your programs or
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provide its data to other programs, you must ensure any problem strings
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are properly escaped. For example, the `createwallet` RPC accepts
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arguments such as `wallet_name` which is a string and could be used
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for a path traversal attack without application level checks. Multiple
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websites have been manipulated because they displayed decoded hex strings
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that included HTML `<script>` tags. For this reason, and others, it is
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recommended to display all serialized data in hex form only.
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## RPC consistency guarantees
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State that can be queried via RPCs is guaranteed to be at least up-to-date with
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the chain state immediately prior to the call's execution. However, the state
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returned by RPCs that reflect the mempool may not be up-to-date with the
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current mempool state.
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### Transaction Pool
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The mempool state returned via an RPC is consistent with itself and with the
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chain state at the time of the call. Thus, the mempool state only encompasses
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transactions that are considered mine-able by the node at the time of the RPC.
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The mempool state returned via an RPC reflects all effects of mempool and chain
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state related RPCs that returned prior to this call.
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### Wallet
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The wallet state returned via an RPC is consistent with itself and with the
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chain state at the time of the call.
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Wallet RPCs will return the latest chain state consistent with prior non-wallet
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RPCs. The effects of all blocks (and transactions in blocks) at the time of the
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call is reflected in the state of all wallet transactions. For example, if a
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block contains transactions that conflicted with mempool transactions, the
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wallet would reflect the removal of these mempool transactions in the state.
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However, the wallet may not be up-to-date with the current state of the mempool
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or the state of the mempool by an RPC that returned before this RPC. For
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example, a wallet transaction that was BIP-125-replaced in the mempool prior to
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this RPC may not yet be reflected as such in this RPC response.
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## Limitations
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There is a known issue in the JSON-RPC interface that can cause a node to crash if
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too many http connections are being opened at the same time because the system runs
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out of available file descriptors. To prevent this from happening you might
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want to increase the number of maximum allowed file descriptors in your system
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and try to prevent opening too many connections to your JSON-RPC interface at the
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same time if this is under your control. It is hard to give general advice
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since this depends on your system but if you make several hundred requests at
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once you are definitely at risk of encountering this issue.
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